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2Summary 
Labour market statistics matter. In normal times, they offer a snapshot on how 
household living standards are faring, and in recessions they also provide a key measure 
of how serious a crisis we face. Because the current coronavirus crisis is rooted in the 
labour market, even more attention is being paid to these statistics than usual. And 
this will only intensify through the rest of 2020 as we enter a new phase of the crisis. 
Labour market statistics matter crucially for policy makers, who will need to decide 
if enough action has already been taken to avoid lasting high unemployment as the 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (JRS) is phased out. In particular, policy makers will 
rely on understanding whether the nine million workers who at some point have been 
furloughed eventually return to work or face redundancy. 
As a result, more attention than usual is being paid to the UK’s official labour market 
data, and measures of unemployment in particular, which are published monthly by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS). But the most recent releases have presented what 
seems at first glance to be a confusing picture. For example, in the June 2020 release, 
the official estimate of the unemployment rate for April hardly budged from that in the 
previous month, and yet the Claimant Count measure of unemployment, based on 
receipt of various out-of-work benefits, increased by a record monthly change of one 
million in April to reach 2.3 million (and then further in May to reach 2.8 million). Media 
coverage and politicians have focused on this huge Claimant Count increase, despite its 
apparent inconsistencies with other available data.
The conclusion of our analysis, presented in this briefing note, is that the particular 
nature of the lockdown period and the policy response to it mean that neither of these 
measures is a reliable guide to the true level of unemployment. 
The Claimant Count measure of unemployment is currently overstating the level of and 
changes in those genuinely unemployed and claiming unemployment-related benefits, 
for two reasons. First, the crisis occurred in the middle of the roll-out of Universal 
Credit (UC), and has dramatically increased the pace of that roll-out by precipitating 
changes in circumstances that necessitate a new benefit claim. Despite efforts to 
ensure consistency over time, the replacement of legacy benefits by UC leads to more 
people being captured in the Claimant Count. This includes those who would have 
previously only claimed Child Tax Credits and Housing Benefit, and claimants awaiting a 
health assessment. Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) data suggest that these 
definitional changes pushed up the Claimant Count by around half a million between 
2013 and the beginning of this year – a period of time in which the Claimant Count was 
rising, while unemployment numbers continued to fall.
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contact between claimants and work coaches between March and June means that 
many new UC recipients have not had their work status accurately updated as quickly 
as they otherwise would. This is particularly important in light of the JRS, with previous 
qualitative work suggesting that some furloughed workers made an out-of-work UC 
claim that would have placed them in the Claimant Count, before they knew they 
were furloughed. In the absence of regular work coach contact, these people will only 
be removed from the Claimant Count when Pay As You Earn (PAYE) information has 
fed through to DWP’s systems. This can take a couple of months, so we might expect 
furloughed workers within the initial Claimant Count surge to move elsewhere in the UC 
statistics in the June data (released in July). There is a similar story for self-employed 
claimants receiving Self-Employed Income Support Scheme (SEISS) grants (which will be 
reported to DWP as income for UC purposes, and so affect this group’s inclusion in the 
Claimant Count) in late May and June.
Analysis of timely longitudinal survey data suggests that at least 27 per cent (400,000), 
and likely many more, of the 1.6 million Claimant Count rise between March and May is 
accounted for by those still working, furloughed workers, or SEISS recipients. While some 
of these people will ultimately be thought of as unemployed, it is far from clear that all 
should be right now. Having also excluded those who were out of work pre-coronavirus 
but have newly claimed UC (for example, due to a change in a partner’s income), we 
estimate that only 45 per cent of the recent Claimant Count rise (700,000 claimants) 
relates to those newly out of work and not receiving other government support via the 
JRS or SEISS.
The effects we have described have put upward pressure on the Claimant Count. Some 
of this will unwind in the coming months, but the extent of that unwinding is far from 
clear. This makes it very hard to understand whether future changes in the Clamant 
Count reflect the wider economy. The Claimant Count has returned to the centre of 
political and economic debates just as its usefulness has been limited (further). It should 
not be considered a good measure of unemployment at the present time.
In contrast to the overestimate provided by the Claimant Count, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment in April will have underestimated any 
increase in unemployment. The ILO unemployment measure classifies a person without 
a job as unemployed if they are out of work, actively looking for work, and available to 
start; if not, then they are classed as economically inactive. It is now clear that, because 
of the nature of the hard lockdown period in the first few months of the crisis and the 
collapse in vacancies it caused, many people who did not have a job during April, or who 
lost self-employed work, did not make an effort to look for new work. This is reflected in 
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the month to April, driven by those inactive for reasons other than the usual ones, and 
those who say they want a job. This effect should reduce as the lockdown eases. So the 
official measure of unemployment understates its current level, and may overstate any 
worsening in the true level of unemployment. 
Because of these two points, it would be more sensible to use the employment rate, 
rather than either of these currently inaccurate measures of unemployment, as the key 
indicator of the state of the labour market. Here, the monthly ONS release provides two 
estimates on the number of people in employment, one based on the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS, which can be split into employees and the self-employed) and one from 
PAYE real-time data (which only captures employees). However, the particular nature of 
the lockdown period, combined with the policy response (in the form of the JRS), means 
that neither of these measures is currently a reliable guide to the amount of productive 
work being done. 
This is because the crisis has led to a very large rise in the number of people who report 
that they have a job (either as an employee or self-employed), but have not actually 
done any work in the reference week – from around 7 per cent of employees in the seven 
weeks before lockdown to just under three-in-ten in the five weeks after lockdown began. 
Some of these will be employees furloughed on the JRS, and so will still be receiving 
some earnings, but not all (for example, some people off sick or self-isolating will not be 
eligible for Statutory Sick Pay). Estimates of the employment rate from the LFS include all 
workers who are not actually doing any work (whether or not they are being paid), while 
estimates from the PAYE data include those not working but being paid, but not those 
still employed but lacking either work or pay. That is why the latter fell by 450,000 in the 
month to April, while the LFS estimate of employee numbers remained flat. The PAYE 
data therefore represents a decent and timely measure of those receiving employee 
earnings, and will be very useful for understanding the impact of the withdrawal of the 
JRS from August onwards.
To gain a complete insight into the amount of productive work actually being done, we 
need to turn to additional indicators published by the ONS. These include the average 
and total hours worked in a week by those who are in employment (average hours fell 
by 23 per cent between early March and the last week in April), and the proportion of 
workers employed and not temporarily away from work. These measures indicate levels 
of employment for those actively having work to do, and should be elevated in ONS 
publications and made as timely as possible.
Our recommendation to users of these labour market statistics is to recognise the 
misleading nature of both common ways of measuring unemployment at present, in 
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said, given that we expect the Claimant Count to be ‘corrected’ downwards in the coming 
months, a further Claimant Count rise in the autumn should be a cause for concern, 
perhaps indicating a second wave of job losses as the JRS ends.
The change in the level of productive employment is a more useful labour market 
barometer at this time, but neither the employment rate in the LFS nor the number of 
paid employees in the PAYE data provides a complete picture of it. On this basis, we 
recommend that users monitor some of the additional indicators published by the ONS, 
such as the average and total hours actually worked by those in employment.
We also recommend that the ONS:
 • Goes to more effort to explain the apparently contradictory findings in its own 
labour market releases, and provides a more detailed commentary discussing the 
implications, and reliability, of the different statistics contained within it (including 
those produced by others). As part of this, it could consider standardising the time 
period that the different statistics relate to.
 • In the short run, splits estimates of total employment from the LFS into those who 
did and did not do any work in the reference week.
How the labour market fares through the next phase of the coronavirus crisis will 
determine the impact on household living standards. Policy makers and commentators 
need a clear, consistent and accurate picture of what is going on if they are to respond 
appropriately. Ensuring that our labour market statistics provide this picture as best 
they can, and that users have the information and guidance to interpret them correctly, 
should therefore be a priority.
As the coronavirus crisis is rooted in the labour market, it is crucial 
that we have timely, accurate information on key labour market 
statistics 
The initial impact of the coronavirus crisis on the UK economy was seen primarily in the 
labour market, with several sectors of the economy fully shut down and others heavily 
affected by the lockdown and social distancing.1
Because of this, a great deal of attention is being paid to the UK’s official labour market 
statistics, and especially the Labour Market Overview and accompanying releases 
published monthly by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).2 These should provide a 
1 For details, see: N Cominetti, L Gardiner & H Slaughter, The Full Monty: Facing up to the challenge of the coronavirus labour market 
crisis, Resolution Foundation, June 2020.
2 This page collects the latest and all previous releases.  
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of how the crisis is affecting household earnings (the key component of living standards), 
and a guide to the scale of job losses in the crisis so far.
However, not all is well. The most recent releases have presented what seems at first 
glance to be a confusing set of statistics. For example, in the June release, the official 
estimate of the unemployment rate for April hardly budged from that in the previous 
month, and yet the Claimant Count measure of unemployment based on receipt of 
various out-of-work benefits rose by 83 per cent over the same period (this note was 
written before the ONS’ July release).3 A large amount of attention from both media 
outlets4 and politicians5 has focused on the big headlines – particularly the Claimant 
Count increase – despite the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies within the 
overall set of statistics.
This is worrying. It is vital that the public and policy makers understand how the labour 
market is performing. We are about to enter a new, critical phase of the crisis during the 
summer and autumn. Policy makers will need to decide soon whether further measures 
are needed to avoid a damaging recession. There is much uncertainty about what will 
happen as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (JRS) is phased out, and huge interest 
in knowing how many of the roughly nine million workers who at some point have been 
furloughed eventually return to work or face redundancy. And, in the midst of the deepest 
and fastest fall in GDP for decades, there is a need to monitor the level and distribution of 
household earnings, the key determinant of living standards.
This note shows what the inconsistencies between the different elements of the ONS’ 
labour market release are (these elements are summarised in Box 1). It then sets out a 
number of their drivers, and provides recommendations to both the ONS and to users 
of these high-profile statistical releases. We do this by analysing the published statistics 
themselves, some of the microdata on which they are based, and the April and May 
waves of the Understanding Society dataset. We have focused our investigations on 
levels and changes over the latest couple of months. However, we present conclusions 
– including advice on how to interpret future statistics – that are relevant to all available 
data. 
3 See: Office for National Statistics, Labour market overview, UK: June 2020, June 2020. 
4 For example, see: BBC, Coronavirus: Job cuts warning as 600,000 roles go in lockdown, June 2020.
5 For example, see: H Stewart, Labour: unemployment could go ‘way beyond anything we’ve experienced’, The Guardian, July 2020.
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7BOX 1: Components of the ONS’ monthly labour market release
6 Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey (LFS) QMI, January 2015.
7 Experimental statistics are still in the development phase and do not meet the rigorous quality standards of ‘National Statistics’. 
See: Office for National Statistics, Guide to Experimental Statistics: Frequently asked questions about statistics in development, 
February 2016.
8 For example, see: Office for National Statistics, Single-month and weekly Labour Force Survey estimates: June 2020, June 2020.
9 For the latest publication, see: Office for National Statistics, Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time 
Information, UK: June 2020, June 2020.
The ONS labour market release 
includes data on labour market status 
from at least three different sources (as 
well as information on job vacancies, 
taken from the Vacancy Survey, and 
Average Weekly Earnings taken from 
the Monthly Wages and Salaries 
Survey). These are:
 • The Labour Force Survey (LFS). This 
is a household survey run by the 
ONS and administered to about 
40,000 households each quarter.6 
Households are asked to report 
members’ economic status in a 
reference week, with the precise 
definitions and classifications in 
line with guidelines issued by the 
International Labour Organisation 
(ILO – see Box 2, below). For 
this reason, the measure of 
unemployment derived from the 
LFS is known as the ILO measure 
of unemployment. Households 
also report how many hours of 
paid work they actually did in the 
reference week (and a wide range 
of other information, including 
employee earnings for a portion of 
the sample). The main estimates 
are presented over a three-month 
period, but the ONS does publish 
single-month estimates, and during 
the current pandemic has also made 
(experimental7) weekly estimates 
available.8 These will, obviously, be 
subject to more sampling error than 
the three-month estimates. Headline 
statistics are published approximately 
a month and a half after the end 
of the latest reference month, with 
‘microdata’ available to researchers 
shortly after.
 • Experimental data from Pay As You 
Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information 
(RTI).9 This comes from information 
provided to HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) by employers 
about the earnings paid to their 
employees. This provides estimates 
of the number of employees and 
amount of earnings in each month. 
The methodology distributes pay 
received across the earnings period 
(typically a week or month), and then 
aggregates this daily data by calendar 
month. Although the most up-to-date 
(‘flash’) estimates are not based on a 
complete set of data, the revisions to 
this data have so far been negligible. 
These flash estimates are published a 
couple of weeks after the end of the 
reference month.
The truth will out | Understanding labour market statistics during the coronavirus crisis
Resolution Foundation
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unemployment, which comes 
from information collected by the 
Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) on how many people are 
receiving a benefit intended for the 
unemployed. Estimates are available 
for the second Thursday each month. 
With the introduction of Universal 
Credit (UC), the Claimant Count 
includes all claimants in receipt of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), and 
Universal Credit claimants who are 
deemed to be in the group who are 
required to be ‘searching for work’ 
as a result of receiving benefits (we 
discuss this later). These statistics are 
published around one month after the 
reference date.
As that description makes clear, the 
three sources have different reference 
dates. This, of course, is easy to correct 
for, but such corrections do not 
eliminate the apparent inconsistencies. 
The two data series on unemployment are painting very different 
pictures 
The June labour market statistics release reported that the number of unemployed 
people (aged 16 and over, assessed by the LFS using the ILO measure – see Box 2, below, 
for details) rose by just 34,000 in April to reach 1.3 million according to the monthly 
estimates (and that there were actually 8,000 fewer people unemployed in the February 
to April period than during January to March). This left both the monthly and three-
month headline unemployment rates stable at 3.9 per cent.
By contrast, the Claimant Count measure of unemployment-related benefit recipients 
increased by around one million in April to reach 2.3 million, and then rose by another 
half a million in May, reaching 2.8 million. The March-to-April increase was the largest 
monthly change in the Claimant Count on record. These two measures of unemployment 
are shown in Figure 1.
These estimates are very different indeed. As we show, we think this is because the 
particular circumstances of the lockdown have introduced discontinuities in both series 
that mean that neither is very useful as a labour market indicator at this time. 
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9FIGURE 1: The Claimant Count measure of unemployment has surged to near-
record levels
Unemployment and unemployment-related benefit claimants, Labour Force Survey 
compared to Claimant Count: UK
NOTES: The Claimant Count is not the same as total unemployment. The measure includes all claimants 
subject to work-search requirements, which may include some employed claimants on low hours or 
earnings. Data is seasonally adjusted.
SOURCE: ONS, Labour Market Statistics.
Changes in the Claimant Count paint a misleading picture during 
this crisis 
Traditionally, the Claimant Count measure of unemployment simply counts the number 
of people receiving the main unemployment benefits. As it comes from administrative 
data, there should be no inaccuracies each month due to sampling error. But the 
Claimant Count does depend on policy focused towards social security benefits at any 
point in time. For example, the growing divergence between the Claimant Count and 
the ILO unemployment measure from the mid-1990s onwards, shown in Figure 1, can be 
explained by the introduction of JSA and of greater requirements on claimants to prepare 
and look for work.10
More recently, the definition of the Claimant Count has shifted markedly on the basis 
of the gradual replacement of JSA with Universal Credit, which combines (income-
based) JSA with five other benefits into a single payment for those both in and out of 
work. As a result, the Claimant Count has switched from simply measuring the JSA 
caseload, to counting those on JSA plus those on UC deemed to be in equivalent or 
10 For a detailed discussion, see Box 1 in: T Phillips, Falling through the cracks: The widening gap between unemployment and benefit 
statistics, Resolution Foundation, January 2018.
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similar circumstances to those who would have been on JSA: the ‘searching for work’ 
conditionality group. Data (covering Great Britain only) suggests that around one-tenth 
of the March-to-May increase in the Claimant Count has been driven by growth in the 
JSA caseload (the National Insurance contribution-based element of which continues 
alongside UC, hence the potential for rises), with the remainder coming from UC.11 And 
there has been a similarly sized increase in UC claimants not included in the Claimant 
Count, mainly those in work.12 So a first point to note is that the Claimant Count is bigger 
than just UC, and UC is (much) bigger than just the Claimant Count.
That being said, this slow transition to UC from 2013 onwards is the driver of the more 
recent pattern of convergence shown in Figure 1, with the Claimant Count rising 
while the ILO unemployment number has continued to fall. This is because UC has 
purposefully introduced changes to benefit eligibility and work-search conditionality that 
have effectively expanded the group included in the Claimant Count.13 There are now 
several new groups of people receiving UC who are included in the ‘searching for work’ 
conditionality group but who would not have appeared in the Claimant Count under the 
legacy system. The most important ones are:
 • People who under the legacy benefits system would only have received Child 
Tax Credits or Housing Benefit. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has 
previously estimated that this equates to around 300,000 additional ‘searching for 
work’ claimants once UC is fully rolled out, compared to the full legacy system.14
 • Those waiting for the conclusion of an assessment for health-related support, 
who would previously have received Employment and Support Allowance in 
the ‘assessment phase’. The OBR estimates that this group is around 200,000 
claimants in steady state.15 Given individuals in this group by definition have a ‘fit 
note’ setting out that they are too ill or sick to work (and may well not be subject 
to any conditionality after their work capability assessment), their inclusion in the 
Claimant Count seems ill-placed.
 • Some UC claimants not deemed to be ‘gainfully’ self-employed, who therefore do 
not have the (now suspended) ‘minimum income floor’ applied to them and are 
subject to work-search requirements.16 There is no information on the size of this 
group.
11 We use GB data because UK Claimant Count data is not available at this level of detail. It shows an increase in the Claimant Count 
of 1.4 million between March and May, 126,000 of which reflects a rising JSA caseload, and 1.3 million of which reflects growth in the 
UC ‘searching for work’ group.
12 Alongside the increase of 1.3 million in UC’s ‘searching for work’ group between March and May, there has been an increase of 
one million in the number of UC claimants in other conditionality groups, mainly in-work claimants. In-work UC claimants are 
analogous to tax credit recipients; however, tax credit statistics are not available on a timely basis so we cannot estimate the net 
total change to the overall number of in-work benefit recipients.
13 For more details, see: A Powell, Universal Credit and the Claimant Count, House of Commons Library, January 2010.
14 Office for Budget Responsibility, Welfare Trends Report, January 2018.
15 Office for Budget Responsibility, Welfare Trends Report, January 2018.
16 Office for Budget Responsibility, Welfare Trends Report, January 2018.
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 • Some out-of-work partners who would not have been expected to look for work in 
the legacy system, and who living in families with combined earnings under a given 
threshold.17
In addition, UC, by design, increases the incentives for claimants to earn small amounts 
of money, thereby improving the financial incentives to move into work. In contrast, tax 
credits claimants have to work a set number of hours to receive support, and although 
those with below-JSA earnings can claim JSA, pound-for-pound benefit withdrawal 
provides no incentive to do so. This is pertinent because those earning under the 
standard allowance in UC (until recently, this was equivalent to JSA rates) are counted 
within the Claimant Count and subject to work-search requirements. So, to the extent 
that UC incentivises people to work at very low levels of earnings more than the legacy 
system did, this will put upward pressure on the Claimant Count.
Quantifying these groups is difficult, but the DWP attempts to do so in an ‘Alternative 
Claimant Count’ that is published on a quarterly basis. This estimates the number of 
(non-JSA) claimants of legacy benefits who would be within the ‘searching for work’ group 
were they on UC.18 No data for the coronavirus period is available yet, but the reduction in 
this group over time suggests that the factors discussed above may have pushed up the 
Claimant Count by around half a million since 2013.19 
Importantly, this slow-burn upward pressure on the Claimant Count has been ramped 
up in recent months. The crisis has accelerated the ‘natural’ migration of claimants 
from legacy benefits to UC, either because changes in circumstances (such as job loss) 
have prompted a new or different benefit claim, or because the £20 per week boost to 
UC (discussed below) has increased the incentive to move onto it for some.20 The total 
UC caseload in Great Britain increased by 75 per cent (2.3 million) in the two months to 
May 2020, having grown by only 66 per cent in the year before that. It is not possible to 
estimate the extent to which this ‘accelerated migration’ effect has pushed up on the 
Claimant Count in the past couple of months, but it appears likely to be material.21
If we were only in the midst of another normal recession, then these reasons alone would 
give us pause for thought when interpreting changes in the Claimant Count, and lead us 
to expect increases to be higher than they would have been in a world without UC. But 
17 This ‘administrative earnings threshold’ is not routinely published by the Government, but the amount was stated as £350 per 
month in the following Freedom of Information request response: www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/uc_intensive_work_search_
and_lig#incoming-743734, accessed 13 July 2020.
18 Department for Work and Pensions, Alternative Claimant Count statistics, April 2020.
19 In 2013 at the start of the UC roll-out, the number of these ‘additionals’ was around 750,000, as of February 2020 it stands at 
264,000. It is – due to a lack of a complete counterfactual – impossible to know if these individuals are actually reflected in the 
increase in the UC ‘searching for work’ group and therefore the Claimant Count, but it seems likely.
20 See Box 2 in: T Bell, M Brewer, L Gardiner, K Handscomb & D Tomlinson, Next steps to support family incomes in the face of the 
coronavirus crisis, Resolution Foundation, March 2020.
21 The Alternative Claimant Count statistics, discussed above, are released quarterly and not currently available for the coronavirus 
period. A significant fall in the ‘additionals’ group in the next publication on 16 July would suggest that some of these migration-to-
UC effects are pushing up on the Claimant Count.
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the nature of the coronavirus crisis means there are additional reasons why the rise in 
the Claimant Count is currently overstating the truth.
First, the decision to increase UC’s standard allowance by £20 per week from April 2020 
has expanded the group of low earners who are subject to full work-search conditionality, 
and therefore included in the Claimant Count. This effect is likely to be small, though, 
with only around 1 per cent of all employees earning between £75 and £95 per week 
(these are the counterfactual and actual UC standard allowances for a single adult aged 
25 and over) during February-April 2020.22
Much more importantly, the DWP suspended all work-search conditions and contact 
between claimants and work coaches during the early months of the coronavirus crisis.23 
This means that the UC system has had less up-to-date information on claimants’ 
employment and earnings than it would otherwise have had.24 This particularly matters at 
this time because of the existence of the JRS. In previous research, we spoke to several 
new UC claimants who had applied to UC after they had been told to stop working, but 
before they had been told that they were going to be put on the JRS (we also spoke to 
working claimants who applied purely because of the publicity surrounding UC and the 
uncertainty surrounding their job).25 Many of these claimants will have been assigned to 
the ‘searching for work’ conditionality group upon application. Furlough payments (and 
other earnings) will be reflected in the PAYE information that the DWP receives from 
HMRC, and will change claimants’ conditionality group assignment, but this could take 
up to eight weeks from when the initial claim is made, and longer if claimants experience 
an earnings gap before furlough pay comes through.26 With the initial surge in UC claims 
having happened in April, it will not be until the June count date that UC’s conditionality 
groups accurately reflect furlough pay (and other earnings) for the majority of this first 
wave of claimants.
There are similar issues for self-employed UC claimants, although here it is not the 
lack of up-to-date information on earnings that is the issue, but the fact that the Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) only started to pay out support from 
the end of May. Many new self-employed UC claimants expecting SEISS grants but not 
currently working will therefore have (to some extent rightly, given their lack of income) 
22 Source: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
23 See: Department for Work and Pensions, DWP’s response to coronavirus (COVID-19), May 2020.
24 Although claimants are required to update their UC claim with any changes of circumstance, it seems unlikely that all claimants 
will be doing this accurately all of the time, especially given reported levels of fraud and error under Universal Credit. See: 
Department for Work and Pensions, Fraud and error in the benefit system, May 2020. 
25 M Brewer & K Handscomb, This time is different – Universal Credit’s first recession: Assessing the welfare system and its effect on 
living standards during the coronavirus epidemic, Resolution Foundation, May 2020.
26 If a claimant makes a claim just after their last pay date, then PAYE earnings information will only be available in the UC system 
one month into the claim. If the claimant’s assessment period ends shortly after the count date for that month’s statistics, the 
claimant’s earnings will only be reflected in the conditionality group they appear in, and therefore the estimate of the Claimant 
Count, two months after the initial claim. This is not a problem unique to UC: the issue is arguably worse under JSA, where there 
is no automated feed of PAYE earnings data to ensure only those eligible continue to receive benefit, in the absence of regular 
claimant-work coach contact.
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joined the ‘searching for work’ conditionality group. After grants are paid, the UC system 
will then be reliant on these individuals reporting their SEISS payment accurately and on 
time in order for their conditionality group to be updated at the end of their assessment 
period (and for the correct amount of UC to be paid). This means that many self-
employed UC claimants may be reclassified out of the Claimant Count from now through 
to August.27
As Jobcentre Plus offices re-open, work coaches should be able to reallocate claimants 
based on their actual circumstances, including furloughed workers and SEISS grant 
recipients, more quickly than set out above. However, this depends on work coach 
capacity, and it seems unlikely that the DWP will able to see all claimants on a regular 
basis until more work coaches are hired over the summer.
Timely survey data confirms that many current workers, furloughed 
workers and self-employed grant recipients are appearing in the 
Claimant Count
To understand the extent to which the issues discussed above may be distorting the 
Claimant Count, we can compare the distribution of new Universal Credit claimants 
by work status and other circumstances in the recent (May) coronavirus wave of the 
longitudinal Understanding Society survey, with the distribution of the increase in the 
UC caseload between the Claimant Count and other conditionality groups in the DWP’s 
statistics. Our analysis is shown in Figure 2. This comparison is not like for like – as 
well as small geographical and timing discrepancies, the Understanding Society data 
reflects benefit inflows, whereas the Universal Credit statistics reflect changes in stocks. 
However, given that the number of UC starts in recent months matches very closely to 
the change in the UC caseload (implying few off-flows),28 it serves as an indicative guide.
The first thing we note from this analysis is that, according to the Understanding Society 
data, more than three-fifths (61 per cent) of new UC claimants are either working, 
receiving furlough pay, or receiving (or expecting to receive) an SEISS grant (with many 
in this category likely to also be bringing in earned income, given the grant is available 
to self-employed people who have suffered any income hit, however small).29 This 
compares to only 45 per cent of the increase in UC claimant numbers coming from 
27 Despite SEISS grants being lumpy and not occurring every month, they will continue to affect some claimants’ UC receipt (and 
conditionality group) in the months after they are received, due to ‘surplus earnings’ rules. This means that the Claimant Count 
is not likely to adjust back up again to the same extent as it adjusts down to reflect SEISS grant receipt. See: S Adam, H Miller & 
T Waters, Income protection for the self-employed and employees during the coronavirus crisis, Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 
2020.
28 There were 1.2 million starts to UC in April 2020 across Great Britain, exactly in line with the 1.2 million increase in UC’s stock of 
claimants between March and April. This apparent lack of UC off-flows is likely partly for administrative reasons relating to a lack of 
the adviser contact during lockdown, discussed above, that would normally capture changes in circumstances leading someone to 
leave Universal Credit.
29  Our findings here are similar to those in: B Baumberg Geiger et al., Claiming but Connected to Work, University of Salford, June 
2020.
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outside the Claimant Count. Taking into account the increase in JSA claimants, too, this 
suggests that at least around a quarter (27 per cent) of the Claimant Count rise across 
the UK (equivalent to around 400,000 claimants) relates to people who are still working, 
furloughed employees or self-employed people with SEISS grants.30 While some of these 
people will ultimately be thought of as unemployed, it is far from clear that all should be 
right now.
FIGURE 2: The proportion of new UC claims we would expect to be looking for 
work is much lower than the Claimant Count suggests
Estimated circumstances of new UC claimants in Understanding Society, and increase 
in persons on Universal Credit by conditionality group: GB/UK
NOTES: UC statistics do not include Northern Ireland. Estimate from Understanding Society are calculated 
are based on respondents who were process of making a claim, or had successfully claimed UC by May. 
Employment status derived based on answers on employment situation, and number of hours worked, 
before lockdown and in latest week, and whether furloughed or applied to SEISS.
SOURCE: RF analysis of ISER, Understanding Society; DWP, Stat Xplore.
And the true number in this category may well be higher still. Figure 2 also shows that, 
according to Understanding Society data, 17 per cent of new UC claimants were not 
working either before or after they claimed UC. There will be various reasons why these 
people have claimed UC in recent months. As well as UC’s increased publicity and the 
accelerated ‘natural’ migration from legacy benefits, discussed above, it is likely that 
30 We arrive at this estimate as follows: 16 per cent (the different between the 61 per cent of new claimants in these groups and the 
45 per cent of the UC increase that sits outside the Claimant Count) / 55 per cent (the proportion of the UC increase that is within 
the Claimant Count) * 1.4 million (the 1.6 million Claimant Count increase across the UK, less the 9 per cent of this coming from 
a rise in JSA claimants) = 416,000 claimants. We make no assumptions about those in the out-of-work groups shown in Figure 
2 being in non-working conditionality groups outside the ‘searching for work’ groups, on the basis that any new health-related 
claimants would still be in their assessment phase and therefore classified as ‘searching for work’ and within the Claimant Count. 
This approach ignores any new non-working claimants in other conditionality groups for other reasons, such as caring.
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some have claimed in response to a partner’s job loss or earnings falls. If these partners 
are still in work and earning above an ‘administrative earnings threshold’,31 the individuals 
in question will have been placed in one of UC’s in-work groups with their partner, rather 
than in the ‘searching for work’ group that determines the Claimant Count.32 This would 
suggest that a greater proportion (than the 27 per cent estimated above) of those 
assigned to the Claimant Count are still in work, furloughed, or have applied for an SEISS 
grant.
Finally, the darker bars on the left-hand side of Figure 2 show that only around one-fifth 
of new UC claims in Understanding Society have recently lost jobs or self-employed work 
(without other government support). Adding in the increase in JSA claims (and assuming 
very low Claimant Count off-flows, on the basis of evidence up to April, discussed above), 
this suggests that only 45 per cent of the Claimant Count increase between March and 
May, or around 700,000 claimants, actually represents newly unemployed individuals.
Overall, then, the Claimant Count had become a poor barometer for unemployment, and 
had fallen out of favour for that reason, in the run up to this crisis. But its timely nature – 
as well, perhaps, as the huge increases it is recording – means that it has returned to the 
centre of policy and economic debates. Unfortunately, these large increases are because 
the old issues with the Claimant Count have become more important, and major new 
issues have come along. This has led to the inclusion of substantial numbers of people 
who would not normally be thought of as unemployed, not least furloughed workers. 
Some of these should unwind relatively quickly as furlough and SEISS payments register 
in the system, but we cannot quantify the size of this unwinding, and other issues will 
endure. As a result, the Claimant Count is not a useful indicator of unemployment levels 
or changes at the present time.
But nor is the ILO measure of unemployment a helpful indicator 
right now, with economic inactivity instead absorbing worklessness
As we reported above, the LFS single-month series for April showed only a small rise 
of 34,000 in unemployment, according to the ILO measure. However, there was a more 
marked change in a different group that is out of work – the economically inactive. 
Economic inactivity showed a rise of around 425,000 in April, or around 300,000 among 
16-64-year-olds. The statistical distinction between unemployment and inactivity is 
crucial here, and we set it out further in Box 2.
31 This ‘administrative earnings threshold’ is not routinely published by the Government, but the amount was stated as £350 per 
month in the following Freedom of Information request response: www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/uc_intensive_work_search_
and_lig#incoming-743734, accessed 13 July 2020.
32 Equivalently, their partner’s earnings may have prevented them from claiming income-based JSA in the legacy system.
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BOX 2: Definitions of employment, unemployment and inactivity
33 Indeed, it should be noted that short-run forecasts for the economy by the OBR and the Bank of England tend to hold economic 
inactivity as broadly fixed, and so inactivity increases such as we are seeing at present can be thought of as equivalent to 
unemployment in these.
34 For details, see: N Cominetti, L Gardiner & H Slaughter, The Full Monty: Facing up to the challenge of the coronavirus labour market 
crisis, Resolution Foundation, June 2020.
The UK’s official labour market 
statistics follow a widely accepted 
framework – used by the International 
Labour Organisation – that is based on 
concepts of labour supply and demand. 
The three main labour market states are 
as follows:
 • Employment consists of people 
aged 16 years and over who did one 
hour or more of paid work over the 
course of a given week, or who had a 
job that they were temporarily away 
from. The largest two categories 
within employment are employees 
paid a wage by an employer, and 
self-employed people who work on 
their own account. There are also 
two minor categories (unpaid family 
workers and people on government-
supported employment and training 
programmes), who in recent years 
have accounted for less than 1 per 
cent of all people in employment.
 • Unemployment consists of people 
aged 16 and over who are without 
a job, have been actively seeking 
work in the past four weeks and are 
available to start work in the next two 
weeks, or who have found a job and 
are waiting to start in the next two 
weeks.
 • Economic inactivity consists of 
people aged 16 and over who do 
not have a job and who are not 
unemployed. The main economically 
inactive groups are students, people 
looking after the family and home, 
those long-term sick and disabled, 
those temporarily sick and disabled, 
retired people and discouraged 
workers.
Our hypothesis is that some of the people who are no longer working and have 
contributed to the rise in inactivity in April 2020 would, in normal times, instead be 
counted as unemployed.33 And, given the circumstances in the UK in late March and 
April 2020, we find it entirely plausible that a newly redundant employee would have 
made little or no effort to look for work. We say this for several reasons. First, there 
was clear government advice to work from home where possible and to avoid public 
transport. Second, there was also a collapse in hiring, as shown by data on vacancies 
(and the highly sectorally concentrated nature of the shock means that taking a new 
job would be more likely than usual to require a move to a different sector).34 Equally, if a 
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self-employed worker had seen her business stopped by the lockdown, it is plausible that 
she might hang on and wait for the lockdown to be lifted, rather than look for work in a 
different area. Additionally, and relevant to both categories of worker, as we mentioned 
above the DWP suspended all forms of conditionality in the social security system as 
lockdown hit. This meant that claimants did not have to look for work as a condition of 
receiving UC or JSA during April.
Evidence to support this hypothesis is provided in Figure 3, which shows economic 
inactivity and two (overlapping) sub-categories within it (necessarily based on three-
month estimates, rather than the more fine-grained monthly ones discussed above). 
It shows that the increase in economic inactivity appears to have been driven entirely 
by rises in those stating they want a job, as well as those failing to classify themselves 
into any of the ‘traditional’ reasons for inactivity (such as study, retirement, sickness or 
caring).35 What we don’t know is whether this is driven by an increase in inflows into these 
groups from other labour market statuses, or by a reduction in outflows.
FIGURE 3: Economic inactivity has risen sharply for ‘other’ reasons, and among 
those who want a job
Economic inactivity among 16+ year olds and selected sub-categories: UK
NOTES: The two sub-categories of economic activity shown are not mutually exclusive; in other words, 
economically inactive people can be both inactive for ‘other’ reasons, and can want a job. We exclude all 
the ‘main’ categories of economic inactivity. These are: student, looking after family / home, temporary sick, 
long-term sick, discouraged workers, and retired.
SOURCE: ONS, Labour Market Statistics.
35 These two groups are not mutually exclusive, so economically inactive people can be recorded in both. 
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We would normally expect something like this to happen during downturns or recessions: 
the phenomenon is known as the ‘discouraged worker effect’, referring to a tendency, 
when the labour market grows weaker, for some unemployed people to stop looking 
for work, on the grounds that jobs will be harder to find.36 But the lockdown made this 
response much more acute than in a normal economic slowdown. The implication 
is that we should pay attention not to the unemployment rate, but to the sum of 
the unemployment and inactivity rate. Of course, we could just as easily track the 
employment rate.37 Unfortunately, as we discuss next in this note, we do not have a 
perfect measure of the employment rate, with the crisis distorting both the employment 
rate as measured by the LFS, and that provided by PAYE (which additionally excludes the 
self-employed). 
The LFS suggests little change in the number of employees in work 
since the crisis started, but PAYE data report a fall of around 450,000 
in the number of employees getting paid
To count the number of employees in work (note that we turn to self-employment later),38 
we can draw on data either from the LFS or from PAYE systems. In April, the PAYE data 
showed a fall in the number of paid employees of around 450,000 from the March level 
(an implied fall in the headline 16-64-year-old employment rate of 1 percentage point, all 
else equal39), but the LFS series showed little change, with an increase of around 50,000 
between the four weeks in April and the four weeks immediately before in the unadjusted 
series that we compare unadjusted PAYE data to. This is shown in Figure 4 (note that the 
two series show different levels, but, as the ONS explains, this is to be expected given 
slightly different coverage).40 
36 See: E Gould, The unemployment rate is not the right measure to make economic policy decisions around the coronavirus-driven 
recession, Economic Policy Institute, March 2020.
37 This is set out very clearly by E Gould, The unemployment rate is not the right measure to make economic policy decisions around 
the coronavirus-driven recession, Economic Policy Institute, March 2020.
38 Two other groups count as employed in the LFS data according to ILO definitions: unpaid family workers and those on government-
supported employment and training programmes (see Box 2). We do not focus on them in this briefing note.
39 Note that the PAYE data covers all age groups rather than just 16-64-year-olds.
40 The two series are not identical in their coverage but they have shown similar trends in recent years. One should not usually put 
much weight on a single-month estimate of the change in employment from the LFS. However, single-month estimates from the 
PAYE data – as we would expect from the larger samples provided by administrative data – show a similarly low level of volatility to 
the three-month estimates from the LFS. This fact, plus the fact that the PAYE data showed a further fall in paid employees in May, 
leads us to conclude that the April PAYE figure is reliable. See: Office for National Statistics, New methods for monthly earnings 
and employment estimates from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information (PAYE RTI) data: December 2019, December 2019.
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FIGURE 4: PAYE data show a fall in paid employees, whereas the weekly Labour 
Force Survey shows no change in employees in employment
Employee employment, PAYE and Labour Force Survey data: UK
NOTES: PAYE and weekly estimates are non-seasonally adjusted; three-month estimates are. Estimates are 
plotted at the centre of the time period they cover.
SOURCE: ONS, Labour Market Statistics.
This is because not all of those in employment are getting paid, and 
more importantly, a large minority in employment are not currently 
doing any work 
If both the PAYE and the LFS series are correct, then it implies there has been a rise in 
the number of employees in work, but not getting paid. 
Unfortunately, neither dataset provides enough information to determine whether this 
is actually the case. But this hypothesis does seem highly likely given what we know 
about employers’ initial response to the lockdown in March and April, and given the 
series in Figure 5, which shows a dramatic rise in the fraction of employees who are in 
employment but not working any hours. Before lockdown, about 7 per cent of employees 
in a normal week reported that they did no work: this includes people on flexible hours 
contracts who have no work scheduled that week, as well as those who are away from 
work through sickness, or who are on leave (note, for example, the blip up during the 
February school half-term week). But the fraction of employees who did not actually do 
any work rose considerably after the full lockdown was announced, on 23 March, to just 
under 30 per cent, or around 7.5 million employees. This was one of the key labour market 
changes of the early months of this crisis.
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FIGURE 5: There has been a sharp rise in those classified as employees but 
working no hours since lockdown began 
Proportion of employees in work but working no hours, by week survey conducted: UK, 
2020
NOTES: Excludes those employees who did not know their working hours.
SOURCE: RF analysis ONS, Labour Force Survey.
Some people in this situation, of course, will have been formally furloughed under the 
JRS and, in this case, they will be receiving some earnings. The LFS did not ask workers 
whether they were on the JRS in April (and nor can it be used to clarify whether those not 
working any hours in the reference week for other reasons received any pay for that time 
or not41). HMRC data (in Figure 6) shows that just under 5 million employees had been 
registered on the JRS at some point up to 27 April, although others may have been told 
by their employer that they were not required to work and would be furloughed, but had 
not yet been registered on the JRS with HMRC.42
The difference between these JRS numbers, and the roughly 7.5 million employees 
not working any hours in an average week over the first five weeks after lockdown 
began, suggests that the latter group will also consist of groups other than furloughed 
employees. This will include those off sick or self-isolating, employees looking after 
children off school, and perhaps some employees who had been offered a job but not 
started yet.43 Some in these groups (as well as employees who would subsequently end 
41 Although hours and employment status questions in the LFS refer to the reference week in question, earnings questions refer to 
“the last time you were paid”. This means that there are no records with an earnings value of £0.
42 The JRS was only opened for employers to register employees a few days before the last week that was covered by LFS data at the 
time of the June release.
43 The Institute for Employment Studies has suggested that some of the fall in PAYE employees could be accounted for by people 
who were due to start a job just before the lockdown, but whose start date has been delayed. This group might count themselves 
as having a job that they’re away from, meaning that they count as employed in the survey data. See: T Wilson, What’s going on with 
the unemployment data?, Institute for Employment Studies, June 2020.
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up on the JRS but had not yet been registered by employers) will be likely to have not 
received any pay during April, for example, if they earn too little to be eligible for Statutory 
Sick Pay. This is likely to explain the discrepancy in the short-run changes in the LFS data 
(which measures employment status regardless of whether hours have been worked or 
pay received for that period) and PAYE data (which only counts employees paid for the 
period in question). 
FIGURE 6: Many of those employed but not working in April would have been 
furloughed under the Job Retention Scheme
Cumulative number of jobs furloughed: UK, 2020
SOURCE: HMRC.
Our analysis so far has focused on employees. To complete the employment picture, 
we need to consider what has happened to the self-employed. Box 3 does this, showing 
that this group looks to have experienced the same phenomenon of a rise in those in 
employment but working no hours, indeed, to a greater extent. Alongside this, and unlike 
among employees, there has been a fall in those recording their headline labour market 
status as self-employed in the LFS, showing that the crisis has initially hit the self-
employed hard.
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BOX 3: The self-employed have been hit hard by the crisis so far
44 For a discussion of the extent to which the highly sector-specific nature of the current crisis is driving its effects in the labour 
market, see: N Cominetti, L Gardiner & H Slaughter, The Full Monty: Facing up to the challenge of the coronavirus labour market 
crisis, Resolution Foundation, June 2020.
The only source of data in the ONS’s 
monthly release that tells us about 
the self-employed is the LFS, and the 
weekly estimates show that average 
self-employment in April was around 
450,000 lower in the four reference 
weeks in April compared to the four 
reference weeks immediately before in 
the unadjusted series, with the headline 
(seasonally adjusted) three-month 
series also showing a slight fall (Figure 
7). 
FIGURE 7: Self-employment has fallen since February 2020
Self-employment, Labour Force Survey data: UK
NOTES: Weekly estimates are non-seasonally adjusted; three-month estimates are. Estimates are plotted 
at the centre of the time period they cover.
SOURCE: ONS, Labour Market Statistics.
In line with this, data from 
Understanding Society (Figure 8) 
suggests that the self-employed were 
hit harder by the initial impact of the 
crisis than employees were. Only 58 
per cent of workers self-employed in 
February were doing any work in May, 
compared to 71 per cent of those who 
were employees before the crisis. 
Of course, this outcome will partly 
be explained by sectoral differences 
between self-employed workers and 
employees, 44 but it is nonetheless 
striking.
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FIGURE 8: Early evidence is that the self-employed were harder hit than 
employees
Employment status of 16-64-year-olds in May Understanding Society data by whether 
self-employed or employee before lockdown: UK
NOTES: ‘In employment, but not working’ is defined as someone not working any hours in the previous 
week.
SOURCE: RF analysis of ISER, Understanding Society.
Bringing this self-employed story together with the employee one, the LFS single-month 
estimates (which are seasonally adjusted) show an overall fall in employment of 430,000 
between March and April 2020, with the 16-64-year-old employment rate falling from 76.7 
per cent to 75.9 per cent. But as we have discussed, this obscures a growing group of ‘no-
hours workers’, some of whom are also ‘no-pay’ workers.
The rise in ‘no-hours workers’ makes average hours a particularly 
useful indicator right now
We will duck the philosophical question of whether someone who does not do any work 
should even be thought of as employed. But the very large rise in this group means that 
the headline employment rate (which ignores whether any work is done) is less useful 
than it is in normal economic times. A more helpful way of thinking about the labour 
market is shown in Figure 9, which splits the fraction who are employed into those who 
do and do not actually work some hours in the reference week (capturing both the self-
employed and employees). Although, for the reasons we mentioned above (including sick 
leave, annual leave, and so on), there are always some people employed but not working 
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in any week, we estimate that, in the five weeks after lockdown began, this labour market 
state contained almost as many working-age adults as the number formally out of work.45 
FIGURE 9: In April, there were almost as many people employed but not 
working as there were not employed
Stylised estimate of 16-64-year-old population by labour market status, by week survey 
conducted: UK, February-April 2020
NOTES: Estimates for employment and worklessness are drawn from the headline February-April data in 
the Labour Market Statistics publication. Those in employment are then split by whether they are working 
any hours or not, based on the data in Figure 5 (but in this instance for all those in employment rather than 
just employees), for the first seven weeks of the quarter (for the ‘pre-lockdown’ estimate) and the last five 
weeks of the quarter (for the ‘during lockdown’ estimate).
SOURCE: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Market Statistics; ONS, Labour Force Survey.
If we are monitoring labour market statistics because of a concern with how household 
living standards are affected, then it is reassuring that many of the people who are 
employed but not working were, in April, receiving earnings supported by the JRS. 
Because of this, it may be sensible to track the employment rate (alongside PAYE data 
on the number of employees being paid). However, if our concern is to monitor the 
productive capacity of the UK economy, then the employment rate including those 
who are not actually working is clearly overstating the amount of work being done. 
Fortunately, the ONS also publishes estimates of the average hours worked among those 
who say that they are employed, and we show these in Figure 10. Average hours worked 
45 This finding is not unique to the LFS but is also seen in the April sweep of the Understanding Society data, which gives the same 
estimate of just over one-fifth of working-age adults being ‘employed’ but not working any hours.
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by those in employment fell by 7 hours from early March to the last week in April, a fall of 
23 per cent. This provides a far more accurate impression of the amount of work being 
done than the employment rate.
FIGURE 10: Average hours have fallen, with more people temporarily away from 
paid work
Average actual hours worked and proportion of workers away from work: UK
NOTES: Being ‘temporarily away from paid work’ is captured in a separate LFS question to average hours 
worked. We show both series, which (unsurprisingly) show very similar trends. This data is seasonally 
adjusted.
SOURCE: ONS, Labour Force Survey weekly estimates.
In sum, then, we suggest a greater focus on measures of average and total hours 
worked by those formally classified as in work – alongside headline labour market status 
measures – for the duration of the lockdown and reopening phase of this crisis. 
Conclusions and recommendations
The monthly labour market assessment provided by the ONS should be an invaluable 
guide to the state of different sectors of the economy, and provide an early indication 
of how the crisis is affecting household earnings, which is the key component of living 
standards. However, some recent releases have presented statistics, particularly on 
unemployment, that can seem confusing, or even inconsistent. This is a concern at 
this time because the coronavirus crisis is rooted in the labour market, and policy 
makers need accurate information on what is happening within it if they are to respond 
effectively as the economy reopens.
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In this note, we have set out how these apparent inconsistencies can be attributed to 
important features of the crisis, and the way that these have interacted with aspects of 
the data sources. 
We conclude that neither of the common measures of unemployment is a useful guide at 
present: 
 • The differing trajectories of the Claimant Count and the unemployment rate in the 
run up to this crisis explain why the former had fallen out of favour already, as it has 
become a poor barometer for unemployment. But the Claimant Count has suddenly 
returned to the centre of policy and economic debates, partly because of the huge 
increases. Unfortunately, these large increases reflect both the old issues with the 
Claimant Count becoming more important, and major new issues coming along. 
Changes to Jobcentre Plus activities and major new income-support policies during 
the lockdown have created new challenges for the Claimant Count. This has led to 
the inclusion of substantial numbers of people who would not normally be thought 
of as unemployed, not least furloughed workers. Some of this should unwind 
relatively quickly as furlough and SEISS payments register in the system, but we 
cannot quantify the size of this unwinding, and other issues will endure. As a result, 
the Claimant Count is not a useful indicator of unemployment levels or changes at 
the present time.
 • Increases in the ILO measure of unemployment, on the other hand, look to have 
been damped down by rises in economic activity, because people have not been 
looking for work during lockdown (and the benefit system has not required them to). 
The problems with both of these unemployment indicators will take time to unwind. So, 
we recommend that labour market statistics users focus on indicators other than these 
unemployment measures in the near future (although, as a timely indicator, a future 
Claimant Count rise in the autumn should be cause for concern in relation to the impacts 
of JRS withdrawal). 
One alternative is therefore to focus on employment. There are (smaller) challenges with 
this data. Estimates of the employment rate from the LFS include all workers who are 
not actually doing any work (whether or not they are being paid), and estimates from 
the PAYE data on paid employees capture those who are paid but not working. These 
groups have grown markedly in recent months due to furloughing, sickness absence 
and increased childcare responsibilities. These measures can be still informative – and 
the PAYE data, being timely, will be particularly useful for understanding the impact 
of the phase-out of the JRS – but should be complemented by a focus on the level of 
productive employment. For this purpose, we recommend that labour market statistics 
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users focus in the coming months on the average and total hours actually worked by 
those in employment, and the proportion of workers temporarily away from work.
We also have recommendations for the ONS as a data producer:
 • The ONS should be praised for its willingness to draw on different sources of data to 
help illuminate key labour market trends. But it should go to more effort to explain 
the apparently contradictory findings in its own labour market release, and provide 
a more detailed commentary discussing the implications, and reliability, of the 
different statistics within it (including those produced by others). As part of this, the 
ONS could consider standardising the time period that the different statistics relate 
to.
 • In the short run, the ONS should consider splitting out the LFS-based estimates 
of employment – both the headline three-month measures and the experimental 
weekly statistics – into those who did and did not do any work in the reference 
week.
Understanding how the labour market fares through the next phase of the coronavirus 
crisis is crucial if policy makers are to effectively support the economy and protect 
household living standards. A clear, consistent and accurate picture of the labour market 
is needed, and providing that picture – and the guidance to interpret it correctly – should 
be a priority.
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